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A SMPI;E MODEL OF THE ECONOMIC LONG W A ~ '  
John D. Stexman 
Recent economic events have revived interest in the economic 
long wave o r  Kondratiev cycle, a cycle of economic expansion and 
depression lasting about fifty years. Since 1975 the System Dynam- 
ics National Model has provided an increasingly rich theory of the  
long wave. The theory revolves around "self-ordering" of capital, 
the dependence of the  capital-producing sectors of the  economy, in 
the aggregate, on their  own output. The long-wave theory growing 
out of the National Model relates capital investment, employment and 
workforce participation, monetary and fiscal policy, inflation, pro- 
ductivity and innovation, and even political values. The advantage of 
the National Model is the rich detail in which economic behavior is 
represented. However, the complexity of the model makes it difficult 
to explain the dynamic hypothesis underlying the long wave in a con- 
cise manner. 
This paper presents a simple model of the economic long wave. 
The structure of the  model is shown to be consistent with the princi- 
ples of bounded rationality. The behavior of the model is analyzed, 
and the role of self-ordering in generating the  long wave is deter- 
mined. The model complements the National Model by providing a 
representation of the  dynamic hypothesis that is amenable to formal 
analysis and is easily extended to include other important mechan- 
isms that  may influence the nature of the long wave. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent events have revived interest in the  economic long wave, sometimes 
known as the Kondratiev cycle, a c cle of economic expansion and depression of 
approximately fifty years' duration.' Most students of the  subject date the  troughs 
of the cycle as the 1830s, 1870s-1890s. 1930s and possibly the 1980s .~  Originally 
proposed by Van Gelderen, De Wolff, and Kondratiev (Van Duijn 1983), early long- 
%his w o r k  is based on a model o r ig ina l ly  developed i n  1979. I am Indebted t o  Dana 
Meadows, Dennis Meadows, J o r g e n  Randers, Leif Ervlk, and Elleabeth Hlcke f o r  a s s i s t a n c e  
w i t h  t h e  1979 vers ion ,  and t o  t h e  Cruppen f o r  Ressurss tud ie r ,  Oalo, f o r  its hospi tal l ty .  
This  r e s e a r c h  w a s  supported i n  p a r t  by  t h e  Sponsors  of t h e  S y s t e m  Dynamlcs National 
Model Pro jec t .  All e r r o r s  a r e  mine. 
2 ~ o n d r a t i e v  (1935) remains t h e  c l a s s i c  of e a r l y  long-wave research .  Van Dul Jn (1983) pro- 
v i d e s  a comprehensive s u r v e y  and a n a l y s i s  of long-wave t h e o r i e s  and empir ical  evidence.  
A good overv lew of e a r l y  long-wave w o r k  and a sampllng of r e c e n t  work  a l so  provided by  
t h e  August and October  1981 fiturns 13(4,5), ed i ted  by Chr i s topher  Freeman; Freeman et 
al. (1982) focus  on unemployment and innovation. 
3~ong-wave  da t ing  is necessar i ly  imprec i se  due t o  t h e  l a c k  of rel iable  data .  Van DuiJn 
(1977) and (1981). 
wave work w a s  b a e d  primarily on the detection of long cycles in economic time 
series. 
Early theories of long cycles stressed w a r  and monetary factors such as gold 
discoveries as causal factors (Tinbergen 1981). Until modern times, Schumpeter's 
(1939) long-wave theory was the  most  complete and revolved .around i n n ~ v a t i o n . ~  
After languishing in the  postwar era ,  the late 1970s witnessed the  emergence of 
long-wave theories based on innovation (Delbeke 1981; Mensch et al. 1981; Mensch 
1979), labor dynamics (Freeman 1979; Freeman et al. 1982), resource scarcity 
(Rostow 1978, 1975), and capital accumulation and class struggle (Mandel 1981, 
1980). As Ernest Mandel (1981, p. 332) notes, 
It  is amusing that  the  long waves of capitalist development also produce 
long waves in the credibility of long-wave theories, as well as additional 
long waves of these theories themselves. 
Y e t  despite the revival of interest, most economists reject the idea of the long 
wave. The existence of at most four cycles and the  lack of reliable data f o r  most  
of that period hamper empirical studies. Most important. neoclassical theory is 
unable to aocount f o r  a disequilibrium mode of behavior with a period of half a 
century. In the absence of formal. testable theories of the long wave, economists 
have correctly remained skeptical. 
Since 1975 the System Dynamics National Model has provided an  increasingly 
rich theory of the long wave (Forrester 1981, 1979, 1977. 1976; Graham and Senge 
1980; Senge 1982). As discussed below, the core of the theory is the "self- 
ordering" of capital by the trapital sector of the economy: the  dependence of 
capital-producing industries, in the aggregate, on their own output. But the  long- 
wave theory growing out of the  National Model is not monocausal: i t  relates trapital 
investment, employment and work force participation, aggregate demand, monetary 
and fiscal policy, inflation, debt, innovation and productivity, and even political 
values. The advantages of the National Model are i ts wide boundary and the  rich 
detail in which economic behavior is represented. However, the complexity of the 
model and the lack of published documentation make it difficult to explain the 
dynamic hypothesis underlying the  long wave in a simple and convincing manner. 
This paper presents a simple model of the economic long wave based on the 
self-ordering hypothesis. The model demonstrates that self-ordering oan account 
fo r  long waves, and isolates the minimum structure sufficient to generate a long 
wave. In addition, the  paper stresses the role of bounded rationality in generating 
the long wave. I t  is shown that  the decision rules represented in the  model f o r  
managing production, investment, and so on are Looally rational. However, when 
interacting in the context of the system as a whole. they produce "imtional" 
behavior: periodic over- and under-expansion of the  economy. 
THE DYNBMC HYPOTHESIS: SELF-OBDERING 
This section outlines the  dynamic hypothesis of self-ordering and sketches a 
conceptual model illustrating the  most important mechanisms that contribute t o  the  
long wave.5 Consider the economy divided into t w o  sectors: the capital sector and 
the goods sector. The capital-producing industries of the economy (the construc- 
tion, heavy equipment, steel, mining, and other basic industries) supply each other 
with the capital plant, equipment, and materials each needs to operate. Viewed in 
%he renaieeance o f  interes t  i n  Schumpeter'e claeeic  work (1939) i e  i l lustrated in, e.g., 
Van Duijn (1981), Menech et al. (1981), and Kleinknecht (1981). 
5 ~ h e  notion of  a dynamic hypotheeie ie diecussed by  Randere (1980). 
the aggregate, the capital sector of the economy orders and acquires capital from 
itself, hence "self-ordering ". 
If the demand for consumer goods and services increases, the consumer-goods 
industry must expand its oapacity and so places orders f o r  new factories, equip- 
ment, vehicles, etc. To supply the higher volume of orders, the  capital-producing 
sector must also expand its capital stock and hence places orders f o r  more build- 
ings, machines, rolling stock, trucks, etc., causing the  total demand f o r  capital to 
r i se  still further ,  a self-reinforcing spiral of increasing orders, a greater  need 
f o r  expansion, and still more ~ r d e r s . ~  
Figure 1 shows the most basic positive feedback loop created by self- 
ordering. The strength of the  self-ordering feedback depends on a number of fac- 
tors, but chiefly on the capital intensity (capital/output ratio) of the capital- 
producing sector. A rough measure of the strength of self-ordering can be calcu- 
lated by considering how much oapital production expands in equilibrium in 
response to an increase in investment in the rest of the economy. 
Production of capital equals the investment in plant and equipment of the 
goods sector plus the investment of the capital sector: 
KPR =Grn+MNV (1) 
where 
KPR = Capital sector, production (capital units/year) 
GINV = G o o d s  sector, investment (capital units/year) 
MNV = Capital sector, investment (capital units/year) 
In equilibrium, investment equals physical depreciation. If the average life- 
t ime of capital (the aggregate of plant and equipment) were twenty years, one- 
twentieth of the capital stock would have to be replaced each year. Thus 
where 
KC = Capital sector, capital stock (capital units) 
U C  = Capital sector, average life of capital (years) 
The capital stock KC is related to capital production KPR by the capital/output 
rat io KCOR (years): 
Substituting for  KINV and KC yields 
Equation 4 indicates how much capital production must increase in the  long run 
when the investment needs of the rest of the economy rise, taking into account the 
ex t ra  capital needed to maintain the capital sector's own stock at the higher level. 
'self-ordering is  closely related to the investment accelerator, which i s  commonly 
thought to be a factor in the 4- to 7-year business cycle. However, recent work as well as 
classics such as Metzler (1941) indicate the business cycle revolves around inventory 
management and suggest the accelerator i s  primarily involved in longer modes (Forrester 
1982; Low 1980; Mass 1975). 
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Assuming an avemge life of capital of twenty years and an average capital/output 
rat io of three  years (approximate values for  the aggregate economy), the  expres- 
sion above yields a multiplier effect of 1.18: in the long run, an increase in invest- 
ment in the rest of the economy yields an additional 16% increase in total invest- 
ment through self-ordering . 
The long wave is an inherently disequilibrium phenomenon, however, and dur- 
ing the transient adjustment to the  long run the strength of self-ordering is 
greater  than in equilibrium. As shown in Figure 2, an increase in orders fo r  capi- 
tal not only increases the  steady-state rate of output required, but, because pro- 
duction of capital lags behind orders, depletes the inventories and s w e l l s  the back- 
logs of the capital sector. To correct  the imbalance, firms must expand output 
above the order  ra te ,  causing desired capital to expand further, and further  swel- 
ling the  total demand fo r  capital. Production m u s t  remain above orders long 
enough to restore inventories and backlogs to normal levels. 
Production Lags behind orders  fo r  several reasons. I t  takes t ime  for  firms to 
recognize that an unanticipated change in demand is permanent enough to warrant 
a change in output. And once desired output rises, it takes time to increase 
employment and especially to increase capacity. 
The disequilibrium pressures of low inventory and high backlog can signifi- 
cantly amplify the effect of an unanticipated change in demand, further  
strengthening the basic self-ordering loop.7 Other mechanisms create additional 
amplification: when orders  fo r  capital exaeed production, delivery t imes  begin to 
rise. Faced with longer lead times and spot-shortages of specialized equipment, 
firms must hedge by ordering far ther  ahead and placing orders with more than one 
supplier, a process described by Thomas W. Mitchell in 1923 (p.645): 
Retailers find that  there  is a shortage of merchandise at their  sources of 
supply. Manufacturers inform them that  it is with great regret that  they 
are able to fill the i r  orders only to the  extent of 80 p e r  cent; there  has 
been an unaccountable shortage of materials that has prevented them 
from producing to their  full capacity. They hope to be able to give full 
service next season, by which time, no doubt, these unexplainable condi- 
tions will have been remedied. However, retailers,  having been disap- 
pointed in deliveries and lost 20 p e r  cent o r  more of their  possible pro- 
fits thereby, are not going to be caught that  way again. If they want 90 
units of an article, they o rder  100 so as to be sure. each, of getting the 
90 in the p ro  rata share  delivered. Probably they are disappointed a 
second t ime.  Hence they increase the  margins of their  orders over what 
they desire, in o rder  that  the i r  p ro  rata shares shall be fo r  each the  full 
100 p e r  cent that  he really wants. Furthermore, to make doubly sure, 
each merchant spreads his orders over more sources of supply. 
The hoarding phenomenon described by Mitchell is quite common, m o s t  recently 
contributing to the gasoline crisis of 1979 (Neff 1982). 
For the aggregate capital sector, however, ordering far ther  ahead to com- 
pensate for  a rising lead time adds to the total demand fo r  capital, causing lead 
t i m e s  to rise still further  and creating still more pressure to order  (Figure 3). 
Other sources of amplification include growth expectations - the spread of 
optimism and pessimism - as described by Wesley Mitchell (1941, p.5): 
Virtually all business problems involve elements that  are not precisely 
known, but must be approximately estimated even fo r  the present, and 
7 ~ a a s  (1980) discusses amplification created by stock-and-flow disequilibrium. 
forecast still more roughly f o r  the future. Probabilities take the place 
of certainties, both among the data upon which reasoning proceeds and 
among the conclusions at which it arrives. This fact  gives hopeful or 
despondent moods a large share in shaping business decisio ns... M o s t  
men find their spirits raised by being in optimistic aompany. Therefore, 
when the f i rs t  beneficiaries of a t rade  revival develop a cheerful frame 
of mind about the business outlook, they become centers of infection, and 
start an epidemic of optimism. 
To the extent expectations of future growth lead to expansion of investment, 
self-ordering ensures the demand for capital wil l  in fact  rise, validating and 
strengthening the forecast of continued growth (Figure 4). 
Interactions with the  labor market further  strengthen self-ordering (Figure 
5). To boost output, the  capital sector expands employment as w e l l  as its capital 
stock. As the pool of unemployed is drawn down, the labor market tight8.m and 
wages rise. Scarcity of skilled workers and higher Labor costs encourage the sub- 
stitution of capital for labor throughout the economy, fur ther  augmenting the  
demand for  capital. Thus one would expect the early phases of a long wave to 
involve expansion of labor and capital together, followed by a period of stagnant 
employment but continued growth in capital and output. Such patterns emerge 
f r o m  simulations of the National Model and have been documented for both the US, 
Europe. and Japan (Freeman 1979; Freeman et al. 1982; Graham and Senge 1980; 
Senge 1982). 
Still more amplification is due to interactions w i t h  the  financial markets (Fig- 
ure 6). Rising oapital demand boosts priaes and profitability, leading to expansion 
of existing firms and the entry of new firms. In addition, the expansion of the asset 
and earnings base of the capital sector increases the external financing available 
f o r  expansion. I t  is through these channels that  monetary policy wil l  influence the 
long wave, by providing (or withholding) credit sufficient to finance the demand 
for investment. Further amplification can be added if. as investment slows near 
the peak of a long wave. the monetary authority expands credit and lowers interest 
rates in an effort to buoy up the  boom.' 
Additional amplification arises f r o m  the familiar consumption multiplier: the 
expansion of the capital sector's output and employment boosts aggregate income, 
which feeds back to fur ther  stimulate investment demand by augmenting the demand 
fo r  consumer goods and housing (Figure 7). 
Interactions between self-ordering and innovation, international trade, and 
political values also exist and may further  amplify the long wave.' 
According to the theory derived from the National Model, the net effect of the 
positive feedback loops described above is to significantly amplify the basic self- 
ordering loop. Once a capital expansion gets under way, these loops sustain it 
until production catches up to orders, excess capital is built up, and orders  begin 
to fa l l .  A t  that  point, the loops reverse: a reduction in orders further  reduces 
investment demand, leading to a contraction in the  capital sector's output and dec- 
lining employment, wages, aggregate demand. and output. Capital production must 
remain below the level required for replacement and long-run growth until the  
' ~ o n e t a r y  stimulus in the latter phases of the long-wave expansion may account in part 
for the historic movement of aggregate prices over the long wave. 
innovation, see the work of Mensch and Freeman. Content analysis of political plat- 
forms has documented 50-year cycles in both American and British political values that 
correspond t o  the timing of the economic cycle (Narnenwirth 1973; Weber 1981). 
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excess physical and financial capital is depreciated - a process that  may take a 
decade o r  more due to the  long lifetimes of plant and equipment. Once the capital 
stock is worn out, investment rises, triggering the next upswing. 
F i r e  8 shows a typical series of long waves generated by the National 
model. The simulation exhibits the  short-term (4- to 7-year) business cycle as 
well as a 48- to 56-year long wave. Several features of the simulation bear com- 
ment: 
1. The long wave is strongest in the capital sector, while the goods sector is 
relatively unaffected. 
2. Capital stock in the  capital sector peaks af ter  production (due to con- 
struction delays) and declines slowly, depressing capital production. 
3. The delivery delay fo r  capital peaks before the peak of production. 
The preceding discussion does not comprise a complete model of the long 
wave. Many important relationships have been omitted. Rather, the relationships 
above constitute a dynamic hypothesis - the essential feedback structure believed 
to be important in the genesis of the long wave. To be a useful hypothesis, the 
importance of self-ordering must be  evaluated in a formal model that  permits 
reproducible tests to be made. Further, the relative importance of the various 
self-ordering loops must be  evaluated. The model developed below is used to 
address the following questions: 
1. Is self-ordering sufficient to produce a long wave? 
2. What factors control the period and amplitude of the  long wave? 
3. What nonlinearities are important in causing the long wave? 
4. How might mechanisms excluded from the  model alter its behavior? 
BOUNDED BATIONALITY 
Before proceeding to the model, this section reviews the  behavioral underpin- 
nings of the theory. The model presented below is based in par t  on the theory of 
bounded rationality (Cyert and March 1963; March 1978; Merton 1936; Nelson and 
Winter 1982; Simon 1947, 1957, 1978, 1979). The essence of the theory is summar- 
ized in the principle of bounded rationality, as formulated by Herbert Simon (1957, 
p. 198) : 
The capacity of the  human mind for  formulating and solving complex 
problems is very small compared with the size of the problem whose solu- 
tion is required fo r  objectively rational behavior in the  real world o r  
even fo r  a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality. 
The theory of bounded rationality is supported by an extremely large and diverse 
body of empirical research, which not only documents the limitations of human 
information processing, but highlights the systematic biases and e r r o r s  deeply 
embedded in the heuristics people use to make decisions. While a complete catalo- 
gue of bounded rationality in its many guises is beyond the  purpose of this paper, 
those aspects most important fo r  theories of economic behavior in general and fo r  
this paper in particular can be stated quite simply.'' 
'O~he behavior is tr iggered by exponentially autocorrelated no ise  i n  exogenous constuner 
demand with a t ime constant of 0.25 y e a r s  and a standard deviat ion of 2.5% of t h e  mean. 
l l ~ o m p l e t e  re ferences  cannot be given here. Excellent discussion and references  t o  t h e  
l i t erature  can be found i n  Kahneman et aL (1982) and Hogarth (1980). Morecroft (1983) 
provides an excel lent  treatment o f  t h e  relat ionships between bounded rational i ty  and eye- 
tern dynamics. See a lso  Dutton and Starbuck (1971). 
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Figure 8b. Lbng wave generated by t h e  National Model : capital  sector 
1. Limited Information-Proceging Capability 
Humans have a limited ability to process information. As a consequence, "per- 
ception of information is not comprehensive but selective" (Hogm3.h 1980, p.4; 
emphasis in original). For both physiological and psychological reasons, people 
take only a very few factors o r  cues into account when making decisions. E'urther, 
the cues that a r e  taken into account are not those with the best predictive ability. 
Rather people focus on cues they judge to be relatively certain, systematically 
excluding uncertain o r  remote information regardless of its importance (Hogarth 
1980, p. 36; Kahneman et al. 1982, esp. Ch. 4, 7-10). Additionally, since "people 
give more weight to data that they consider causally related to a target 
object. ..," they focus on cues they believe to be meaningful (Hogarth 1980, p. 42- 
43, emphasis in original). However, precisely because of limited information- 
processing capability and the aversion to unoertainty, people are notoriously poor 
judges of causality and correlation, and in controlled experiments systematically 
create mental models at variance with the known situation.12 Ironically, "people 
tend to believe that they pay attention to many cues, although models based on only 
a f e w  cues can reproduce their judgements to a high degree of accuracy" (Hogarth 
1980, p. 48). Though sometimes aware of the pitfalls in judgement and inference, 
people, including many professionally trained in statistics, consistently assert that 
their own performances a r e  immune, are reluctant to abandon their mental models 
and selectively use hindsight to "validate" their mental models.13 
As a consequence of limited information-processing ability, organizations (and 
the individuals within them) divide the total task of the organization into smaller 
units. By establishing subgonls assigned to subunits within the organization, the 
complexity of the total problem is vastly reduced. The subunits in the hierarchy 
ignore, o r  treat as oonstant or exogenous, those aspects of the total situation that 
are not directly related to their subgoal (Simon 1947, p.79): 
Individual choice takes place in an environment of "givens" - premises 
that are accepted by the subject a s  bases for  his choice . . . 
Limited information-processing ability also forces people within organiza- 
tional subunits to evolve simple heuristics o r  rules of thumb to make decisions. 
The rules of thumb rely on relatively certain information that is locally available 
to the subunit. Rules of thumb are also aomputationally simple (Morecroft 1983, 
p.133): 
In the short run, these procedures do not change, and represent the 
accumulated learning embodied in the factored decision making of the 
organization. Rules of thumb need employ only small amounts of informa- 
tion.. . Rules of thumb process information in a straightforward manner, 
recognizing the computational limits of normal human decision makers 
under pressure of time. 
Such factoring is central to the management of all but the smallest enter- 
prises. Indeed, organization, as Simon (1947, p.80) states, "permits the individual 
12~ogar th  (1980) diecueeee numerous separate eources of biaa i n  decision making. Among 
t h e  common fallacies of caueal attribution are t h e  gambler's fallacy and t h e  regreeeion 
fallacy. (Tveraky and Xahnsman 1974). 
13see Kahnsman et al. (1982), eepecially Ch.2,9-12,20, and 23. Coffman'e (1959) "dramatur- 
gic" model of public behavior is relevant here: People constantly ad jus t  their public per- 
formance~ 80 ae t o  enhance their statue and competence i n  the eyes of othere. 
to approach reasonably near to objective rationality." The implicit assumption 
(necessitated by the complexity of the total situation and the limited t i m e  available 
fo r  decision making) is that  the  task is separable in the sense that achieving the 
subgoals ensures attainment of the larger goal. 
THE PODEL 
The model will  be presented in several stages. First, a simplified, generic 
model of a firm o r  sector of the  economy will  be developed (the "production sec- 
tor"). I t  wil l  be shown, through partial model tests, that the  decision rules fo r  
production and investment yield rational behavior in the  simplified environment 
presumed by each subunit of the organization. The model will then be used to 
represent the aggregate capital-producing sector of the economy, including self- 
ordering. Finally, simulation experiments will  be used to establish the relative 
contribution of the structural and parametric assumptions to the resulting long- 
wave behavior. l4 
Pt = Bt / NAD (3) 
where 
P !  = Production rate (units/year) 
PC = Production capacity (units/yerrr) 
CU = Capacity utilization (fraction) 
P = Indicated production (units/year) 
B = Backlog of unfilled orders (units) 
NDD = Normal delivery delay (years) 
Equations 1 through 3 describe production and capacity utilization. Production 
rate P !  is determined by production capacity PC and the  rate of capacity utiliza- 
tion CU. Capacity utilization is determined by the  ratio of indicated production to 
production capacity, a measure of demand relative to supply. Indicated production 
represents the ra te  of production that  would be  required to deliver an order  with 
the  normal delivery delay NDD. The normal delivery delay represents the time 
required, in equilibrium, to process, produce, and deliver an order. 
A s  shown in Figure 9, capacity utilization varies nonlinearly with the ratio 
IF /PC. When P/PC > 1 ,  the rate of production required to meet the normal 
delivery delay exceeds capacity, which becomes a binding constraint on produc- 
tion. If indicated production drops below capacity, however, output is curtailed. 
(Since inventories a r e  not represented, p r o d ~ c t i o ~  and shipments a r e  always 
14T'he model I s  formulated In continuoua t ime a s  e set of Integral equations, and was simu- 
lated using Euler integration ( s e e  Appendix). 
equal, and if there a r e  no orders to be filled, production must decline to zero 
unless one assumes firms simply throw the extra output away.) If firms wanted to 
maintain the normal delivery delay regardless of capacity, capacity utilization 
would fall in proportion to the decline in demand, production would equal indicated 
production, and CU would lie along h e  A. If firms wanted to continue to operate 
at full capacity at all times, even in the face of diminished demand, utilization 
would fall only when the sector w a s  producing at the minimum delivery delay, 
defined by line B . ' ~  Capacity utilization is specified as a compromise between these 
two extremes: if indicated production drops below capacity, firms are assumed to 
reduce utilization only sllghtly, preferring to maintain relatively full utillzation 
(and hence revenues) by drawing down their backlogs. Delivery delays would 
become shorter than normal. If backlog continued to fall, utilization would be cut 
back, but at less than proportional rates, until firms w e r e  producing at the 
minimum delivery delay. Further declines in backlog then force proportional 
reductions in output. The behavior described by the capacity utilization formula- 
tion is illustrated by the following description of the machine tool industry &si- 
nes~  Week. 1 4  March 1982, p.20): 
Bad a s  they are,  shipments are outpacing orders by a very wide margin, 
forcing a continued rundown in the industry's order backlog ... A t  the 
average shipment rate of the past three months, backlogs provide less 
than six months of production, in an industry that had a one-year backlog 
when the recession beg an... the low level of capacity utilization suggests 
that shipments will run ahead of orders we l l  into summer. 
where 
C = Capital stock (capital units) 
COR = Capital/output ratio (years) 
Production capacity is determined by capital and the capital/output ratio. 
For simplicity, capital is the only explicit factor of productlon, and the 
capital/output ratio is assumed fixed, implicitly assuming other factors (particu- 
larly labor) are freely available.16 
15Line B de te rmines  t h e  minimum d e l i v e r y  delay because t h e  a c t u a l  d e l i v e r y  de lay  o r  
a v e r a g e  res idence  t i m e  of a n  o r d e r  i n  t h e  backlog is given  by Ll)iB/F?ZiB/ W W ) .  When 
W=b*(P/FC) f o r  b > 1 and b a ( I P / R )  61, 1.9. when CU U e s  along l i n e  B 
a D e /  (PC.b(IP/R))=B/ (baIP) but  IP=B/hW, a o  I#)=B/ (baB/hEkD)=hEkD/ b = m  where  
YID - Minimum d e l i v e r y  de lay  (years). 
1 6 ~ h o u g h  a more  complete model would include a more sophis t i ca ted  production funct ion 
w l t h  both v a r i a b l e  labor  and a v a r i a b l e  w o r k  week, t h e  dynamics of l abor  acquisi t ion a r e  
p r imar i ly  assoc ia ted  w l t h  t h e  shor t - t e rm business  cyc le  (see foo tno te  6). However, s i n c e  
r i s i n g  wages c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  s t r e n g t h  of self-ordering during a long-wave expansion 
(Figure 5). omission of l abor  a s  a n  e x p l i c i t  f a c t o r  is Ukely  t o  reduce t h e  model's a b i U t y  t o  
g e n e r a t e  a long wave. F o r  a dynamic model w l t h  multiple f a c t o r s  of  production t h a t  con- 
f o r m s  t o  t h e  pr inciples  of bounded r a t i o n a U t y  see Sterrnan (1981, 1982). 
INDICATED PRODUCTION IP NSIONLESS, 
PRODUCTION CAPACITY PC 
Figure 9.  Capacity u t i l i z a t i o n  
INDICATED CAPITAL ORDER FRACTION ICOF ( FRACTION /YEAR 
h- rUc 
Figure 10.  Capital order f rac t ion  
where 
CA = Capital acquisitions (capital units/year) 
W = Capital discards (capital units/year) 
Capital stock, representing both plant and equipment, is the accumulation of capi- 
tal acquisitions CA less capital discards W. 
The simplest formulation for capital discards is to assume all units have an equal 
probability of being discarded regardless of age, defining (in equilibrium) an 
exponential probability density for  the age of individual units, with the mean physi- 
cal life given by the a v e y e  life of capital ALC. For simplicity, the average l i f e  
time is assumed mnstmt. l 
where 
SL = Supply line of unfilled orders for capital (capital units) 
= Delivery delay for  oapital (years) 
Capital acquisition, o r  grass investment, is determined by the seator's supply line 
o r  backlog of unfilled orders for capital (including capital under construction) and 
the average delay in acquiring those units (including the time required for  con- 
struction). In general, the delivery delay for  capital w i l l  vary according to the 
capacity of the supplying industries relative to the demand. 
where 
CO=capital orders (capital units/year). 
The sector's supply line is augmented as orders for capital are placed with sup- 
pliers, and is diminished when construction is completed and the capital enters the 
productive stock of the sector. 
17~termsn (1980) contrade the lumped capital dock used here to a model with  capital 
disaggregated by vintage. A more complete model would also include a variable average 
lifetime to represent variations i n  the discard rate. 
where 
CQYP = Capital order  fraction (fraction/yeetr) 
I C W  = Indicated capital order  fraction (fraction/year) 
CC = Correction to orders from capital stock (capital units/year) 
CSL = Correction to orders from supply line (capital units/year) 
Though capital acquisition oorresponds to investment, it is the order  rate for  
capital that  determines acquisitions. Three motivations for  ordering capital a r e  
assumed: First, to replace discards; second, to correct  any discrepancy between 
the desired and actual capital stock; and third, to correct  any discrepancy 
between the desired and actual supply line. l8 The sum of these three  pressures, as 
a fraction of the  existing capital sbuk .  defines the indioated capital order frac- 
tion ICQYP. However, in extreme c i r c ~ c e s  the indicated capital order  frac- 
tion may take on unreasonable values. For example, an extreme exoess of capacity 
could cause I C W  to be negative. A s  shown in Figure 10, the  actual order  fraction 
COF is a nonlinear function of the  indioated order fraction. Since gross investment 
must be positive, COF asymptotically approaches zero as I C W  drops below 5% 
year." Similarly, if demand f a r  exceeds capacity, the indicated order  fraction 
may take on unreasonably large values. I t  is assumed that  the Wi mu m capital 
order  fraction is 30% of the capital stock per  year. The l imit  reflects physical 
constraints to rapid expansion such as labor and materials bottlenecks, financial 
constraints, and organizational pressures .20 
1 8 ~ n v e e k w n t  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  growth e x p e c t a t i o n s  would have  t o  be included i n  a more corn- 
p l e t e  model. The inves tment  funct ion of  t h e  model is a simplified v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  S y s t e m  
Dynamics National Model invea tment  funct ion.  Senge (1978,1980) s h o n e  t h e  SDNM funct ion 
reduces  t o  t h e  neoclassical  i n v e s k a e n t  funct ion (e.g. Jorgenson  1963; Jorgenson  ct UL 
1970) when a v a r i e t y  of  equilibrium and p e r f e c t  information assumptions are made. The 
SDNM funct ion is shown t o  p rov ide  a b e t t a r  atatistical flt of invee tment  d a t a  and t o  
behave more plausibly t h a n  t h e  neoclassical  funct ion when faced  wi th  v a r i o u s  test inputs .  
 he formulat ion f o r  COF exc ludes  o r d e r  canceIlations. Disallowing cancel lat ions is a 
s implifying assumption. A more complete model would d i saggrega te  unfilled o r d e r s  f r o m  
u n i t s  under cons t ruc t ion  and would r e p r e s e n t  cancel lat ions e x p l i c i t l y  (Sterman 1981). 
The formulat ion f o r  CYF amoothly approaches s e r o  d u e  t o  t h e  aggregat ion of firms, some of 
which wlll be order ing  nonaero amounts even  when t h e  a v e r a g e  ICCF < 0. The va lues  of C W  
f o r  ICQF < 0.05 w e r e  es t imated  by assuming (1) t h e  o rder ing  funct ion of a mingle f l r m  is 
CtF = IULY(0JCOT) and (2) ICQF f o r  t h e  aggrega te  s e c t o r  is d i s t r i b u t e d  normally w i t h  a 
v a r i a n c e  of O.O5/year. 
20 
The va lues  of C W  f o r  ICQF S 0.05 w e r e  der ived  by assurnlng t h e  o r d e r  funct ion of an indi- 
vidual  f i r m  w a s  lKN(0.30JCQF) and t h a t  ICQF is d i s t r i b u t e d  normally wi th  a v a r i a n c e  of 
O.O5/year. 
D L ,  = mt * PDm, 
where 
M'L = Desired supply line (capital units) 
TASt = Time to adjust supply line (years) 
PDDC = Perceived delivery delay for capital (years) 
Dm = Delivery delay for  capital (years) 
Equations 12 through 14 describe the management of the supply line. Firms 
strive to eliminate discrepancies between the desired and actual supply line within 
the time to adjust supply line TASL. To ensure an appropriate acquisition rate, 
firms must maintain a supply line proportional to the delivery delay they face in 
acquiring capital: as described by Mitchell (1923). if the delivery delay rises, 
firms must plan for  and order new capital farther ahead, increasing the required 
supply line. The desired supply line is based on relatively certain information: 
the discard rate and the delivery delay for  capital perceived by the firm. For sim- 
plicity, delays in perceiving the m e  lead time for capital are not represented, 
thus the perceived delivery delay for  capital is assumed to equal the actual 
delivery delay. However, the relationship between delivery delay and the desired 
supply line is likely to be highly nonlinear: as Mitchell notes, initially a change in 
delivery delay may produce a more than proportional change in orders due to 
hoarding and panic. And rather than expand orders continually as lead times rise, 
chronically high delivery delays would eventually cause firms to seek substitutes, 
limiting the desired supply line. The sensitivity of the model to the decision rule 
for  desired supply line is tested below. 
CCt = (DCt - Ct ) TAC (15) 
ICt = I . :  * COR (17) 
where 
DC = Desired capital (capital units) 
TAC = Time to adjust capital (years) 
RC = Reference capital (capital units) 
IC = Indicated capital (capital units) 
E.= Indicated production capacity (units/year) 
Equations 15 to 17 describe the adjustment of capacity to desired levels. Like 
the supply U e  correction, firms attempt to correct  discrepancies between desired 
and actual capital stock over a period of time given by the time to adjust capital. 
Desired capital is nonlinearly related to the indicated capital stock, which is the 
stock needed to provide the indicated production capacity I E .  (Indicated produc- 
tion capacity is the capacity judged necessary to m e e t  expected demand.) As 
shown in Figure 11, diminishing returns to uapital are assumed to set in when IC 
becomes large relative to a referenae level of capital RC (set at the initial eqnili- 
b r i m  of the system). Though labor is not explicitly represented, the linear range 
of the relationship between IC and PC implies employment can be expanded in pr* 
portion to capital. As the available labor supply is exhausted, however, further 
expansion of capital lowers the marginal productivity of capital and diminishes 
incentives for further expansion even if demand remains high. 
CBt = (Bt - IBt ) / TAB (19) 
where 
EO = Expected orders (units/year) 
CB = Correction from backlog (units/year) 
LB = Indicated backlog (units) 
TAB = Time to adjust backlog (years) 
Equations 18 through 20 determine indiaated production capacity. I t  reflects the 
capacity the sector judges necessary both to fill expected orders EO and adjust 
the backlog of unfilled orders to an appropriate level. The speed with which the 
sector strives to correct  discrepancies between the actual and indicated backlog 
is determined by the time to adjust backlog, a reflection of the sector's sensitivity 
to abnormal delivery delays. Indicated backlog is the backlog that would be neces- 
sary to fill the expected order rate within the normal delivery delay. 
OR, - EO, 
= J TAO 
t 0 
where 
TAO = Time to average orders. 
INDICATED CAPITAL IC (DMENSIDIJLESS) 
REFERENCE CAPITAL RC 
Figure 11. Desired capi ta l  stock 
The expected order rate represents the sector's forecast of demand condi- 
tional on available information and the rules of thumb for forecasting used by the 
sector. The firm is assumed to forecast demand by averaging past orders. Orders 
a r e  averaged because i t  takes time for  firms to decide that an unanticipated 
change in demand is lasting enough to warrant capacity expansion. The averaging 
serves to filter out short-term noise in demand, providing a more certain measure 
of long-run demand than the r a w  order rate,  and preventing wild swings in invest- 
ment by allowing the backlog to buffer the system from the short-term variability 
of demand. First-order exponential smoothing is assumed fo r  the averaging pro- 
cess. The smoothing time is given by the time to average orders TAO." 
ORt = exogenous (24) 
Finally, the delivery delay for  the sector's output, o r  average residence time 
of an order in the backlog, is  given by the rat io of backlog to production. The 
backlog of unfilled orders accumulates orders less shipments (production). The 
order  ra te  is assumed exogenous; delivery delay fo r  capital is exogenous and 
assumed constant. 
The parameter values assumed for  the analysis are summarized in Table 1. 
The parameters were chosen to represent a producer of capital goods. The param- 
eters a r e  broadly consistent with survey and econometric evidence reported in 
various studies. But because the model  excludes all but the most basic channels 
through which self-ordering operates, precise estimation is not warranted. The 
sensitivity of the model to the key parameters is analyzed below. 
THE LOCAL EATIONALWY OF THE DECISION BUMS 
The behavioral formulations in the model conform to the principles of bounded 
rationality: management of the firm is broken down into several distinct decisions 
(production, investment, demand forecasting, etc.). The individual decision rules 
rely on locally available, relatively certain information. For example, desired 
production capacity relies on the backlog and average orders ra ther  than the 
current and less certain order rate. Similarly, the desired supply line requires 
knowledge only of the replacement ra te  of investment and the delivery delay for  
capital experienced by the firm, and does not consider the condition of capital 
suppliers o r  the effect demand changes might have on availability. Simple rules of 
thumb are used to  determine how much capital to  keep on order, how fast to adjust 
production capacity, and how to manage backlogs. To test the local o r  intended 
rationality of the decision rules, this section describes partial model  tests of the 
'krowth expectation8 would have t o  be included in a more complete model of demand fore- 
casting, and would add amplification. 
Table 1. Parameters 
&!!EL Def in i t ion  Value (years)  
AU: 
COR 
NDD 
DDC 
TAB 
TAO 
TAC 
TASL 
Average Life  of Capi ta l  
Capital/Output Ratio 
Normal Delivery Delay 
Delivery Delay f o r  Cap i t a l  
Time t o  Ad j u s t  Backlog 
Time to Average Oreers 
Time t o  M j u s t  Capi ta l  
Time to M j u s t  Supply Line 
A I L  : Coen [I9751 found s e r v i c e  l i v e s  ranging from 8 t o  22 yea r s  
f o r  equipment and 20 t o  5C years  for  s t r u c t u r e s .  Sterman 
[1981] est imated a 20-year l i f e t i m e  f o r  the  aggregate of 
p l a n t  and equipnent.  
COR: The mean value of r e e l  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  s tock / rea l  GNP 
(1958 $) from 1946 t o  1970 = 2.9. [His to r i ca l  S t a t i s t i c s  
of t h e  U.S. S e r i e s  F-470/F-321. 
NDD & DDC: Mayer [1960] found mean lead times f o r  p l a n t  and equipment 
(planning t o  completion) of 22 months ( 5  months planning 
and 17 months ordering and cons t ruc t ion  d e l a y s ) .  Since . 
t h e  s e c t o r  r ep resen t s  a c a p i t a l  producer,  NDD=DDC. 
TAB : TAB should be comparable t o  NDD: Firms would not  want t o  
t r y  t o  a d j u s t  backlogs f a s t e r  than products  can be 
del ivered;  but  TAB>>NDD implies  a s lugg i sh  response t o  
abnormal d e l i v e r y  delays.  Senge [1978], using nondurable 
manufacturing d a t a ,  found no s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
d i f f e r e n c e  between NDD and TAB. 
TAD should be g r e a t e r  than TAB t o  r e f l e c t  t h e  low weight 
managers p lace  on c u r r e n t  and h ighly  uncer ta in  o rde r s  
compared to t h e  much more c e r t a i n  backlog. Senge [1978] 
found TAO>TAB (using sh ipnen t s  ins tead  of o r d e r s  a s  the 
measure of demand). 
TAC & TASL: Senge [I9781 ,found TAC=12.1 q u a r t e r s  (est. s t d .  dev. 2.2 
q u a r t e r s ) .  TASL should be comparable t o  TAC so t h a t  
2 rde r s  i n  planning a r e  weighted i n  t h e  order  decis ion  a s  
neavi ly  as u n i t s  in  the  productive s tock.  If  TASLBTAC, 
overordering r e s u l t s  as c a p i t a l  on o rde r  is p n r t i a l l y  
ignored; i f  TASL<TAC, o r d e r s  in  t h e  supply l i n e  a r e  
counted more heavi ly  i n  the  investment dec i s ion  than 
c a p i t a l  i t s e l f  . 
production and investment decisions. A minimum requirement for intended 
rationality is that the individual decision rules respond wel l  to shocks when the 
decision rules are tested in isolation. 
1. Demand Forecasting and Backlog Management 
Equations 18 through 21 describe the demand forecasting procedure and 
determination of desired capacity. To test the intended rationality of this decision 
rule, the sector w a s  subjected to a sudden, unanticipated increase in orders of 
five percent at the start of year one. To isolate the decision rule, it  w a s  assumed 
that 
Capacity then places no constraint on production, and the production scheduling 
equations become the only determinants of the sector's behavior. 
The result (Figure 12) is a smooth and orderly response. Immediately after  
the shock, expected orders and production are unchanged and the backlog begins 
to rise. A s  backlog rises, however, firms recognize the growing discrepancy 
between the backlog and the backlog consistent wlth the normal delivery delay. 
Production is adjusted above expected orders by exactly enough to keep delivery 
delay constant. Simultaneously, as management comes to believe the new level of 
demand will persist, expected orders rise, gradually shifting the burden of adjust- 
ment from the correction from backlog to the demand forecast.22 The response is 
extremely rational in the sense that: it  is appropriate - in equilibrium, expected 
output, output, and backlog have all expanded by five percent. I t  is also orderly - 
expected orders, production, and backlog all smoothly approach their new equili- 
brium values. Even though expected orders lag behind actual orders, delivery 
delay rematns constant at its normal value. The expected order rate covers 9 5 X  of 
the initial discrepancy in six years. Production covers 9 5 X  of the initial 
discrepancy within 4.5 years. 
2. Invednmnt and Capacity Acquiaition 
Equations 5 through 17 describe the determinants of investment and capacity 
acquisition. To test the local rationality of this decision rule, i t  is assumed that 
indicated production capacity is exogenous. The sector is subjected to a sudden, 
unanticipated increase in indicated production capacity of five percent in year 
one. I t  is assumed the sector faces a constant delivery delay for capital, elimimt- 
ing the possibility of bottlenecks in the supplying industry. 
Again, the response (Figure 13) is smooth and orderly. Immediately after  the 
shock, there is a maximum discrepancy between desired and actual capital, and 
orders for capital rise to a peak. A s  the supply line fills, the order rate drops, 
for even though the capital stock does not increase immediately, the units ordered 
but not yet received are taken into account when placing future orders. Overord- 
ering, an obvious source of instability, is thus prevented. As the supply line rises, 
so too do acquisitions, which peak two years after  the shock. A s  capital increases 
2%he equations for indicated production capacity (18 through 20) reduce to: 
E=EO+GB=EO+(B -B)/W 
= EO (1 -MD/ TAB) + B /  W 
The base case assumes W=MI), so E43/ W 43/h&Y), thus E always equals the pro- 
duction rate consistent with m, which is why ID remains constant in the test.  
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Figure 12. Response o f  production scheduling 
subsector t o  s t e p  i n  orders  
YEARS 
Figure 13. Response o f  investment subsec tor  
t o  s t e p  i n  des i red  c a p i t a l  
the burden of investment shifts back to replacements, and in equilibrium the 
desired and actual stock are again equal (likewise the desired and actual =ply 
line). Like the production scheduling equations, the response is extremely 
rational: the adjustment is appropriate, orderly, and essentially completed (over 
95%) within twelve years. 
3. Testing the Complete Production Sector 
The partial model tests show that the decision rule f o r  investment can t rack 
changes in desired capacity without overshoot o r  instability. Similarly, the pro- 
duction scheduling decision can accommodate unanticipated changes in demand 
smoothly and without disruption. The next test examines the  ability of the entire 
sector to respond to a change in demand. In the test, the sector faces a five per- 
cent unanticipated increase in orders at the start of year one. The delivery delay 
for  capital is assumed constant. 
The result (Figure 14) is a highly damped oscillation with a period of about 
twenty years. In contrast to the previous tests, production and capacity now 
overshoot orders, then undershoot slightly before reaching equilibrium. Because 
capacity (and production) lag behind orders, the backlog (and delivery delay) must 
rise. When production equals orders (in year six), backlog stops increasing and 
reaches its maximum. Delivery delay peaks slightly earlier.  In order to reduce 
delivery delay to normal levels, production and capacity must continue to expand 
above orders. By year eight, delivery delay is once again normal, but production 
still rises due to growing capacity and industry reluctance to reduce utilization. 
By year ten, backlog has fallen enough to begin to force utilization down, but 
because firms prefer  to maintain full utilization, output continues to exceed ord- 
ers ,  and delivery delay falls below normal as firms draw down their backlogs to 
preserve profitability. Faced with excess capacity, investment is cut back, and by 
the twelfth year, capacity begins to decline. For delivery delay to return to nor- 
mal, the backlog must rise, forcing output and capacity below orders. But when 
delivery delay has returned to normal, aapacity is once again insufficient, trigger- 
ing a second, though much smaller, overshoot. 
The test shows that as the complexity of the system grows relative to the sim- 
plifying assumptions and decision rules used by the subsectors of the organization, 
the rationality of the organization's response to change is degraded. Y e t  despite 
the overshoot, the system's response is, on the whole, still ra ther  rational. The 
majority of the behavior is a direct oonsequence of the physical constraints facing 
the firms in the sector. Since production must lag behind orders backlogs mus t  
initially rise. Therefore output and aapacity mus t  exceed orders to bring backlog 
back down. Overshoot is an inevitable consequence of the lags in expanding out- 
put. Oscillation, however, is  not: the existence of oscillation is a consequence of 
decentralized decision making and the aggressiveness with which people attempt to 
correct  perceived imbalances. Still, the system exhibits a high degree of damping 
(93% of the cycle is damped each period). And though output rises to a peak 65% 
greater  than the'change in orders, rising delivery delays a r e  arrested within four 
years, production settles within 2% of its equilibrium value after  fifteen years, and 
utilization never drops below 97%. The behavior represents a good compromise 
between a speedy response and ~ tab i l i ty . '~  
23~he  20-year cycle ie consistent with earlier modale of capital investment and empirical 
work on construction of Kuenete cycles. See Forrester (1982). Low (1980), and Mass 
(1975) for models of Kuznete-type cycles arising out of capital-investment policies. For 
empirical work on Kuenete cycles see, e.g., Hlckman (1963) and Kuenets (1930). 
Figure 14a. R e s p o n s ~  of production s e c t o r  t o  s t e p  i n  orders: 
output and capaci ty  
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Figure 14b. Respmse of  production s e c t o r  t o  s t e p  i n  orders:  
u t i l i z a t i o n ,  d e l i v e r y  d e l a y ,  and c a p i t a l  orders 
TESTING THE DYNAMIC HYPOTEIESIS 
Having established the  local rationality of the subsectors of the  model, the  
production sector  can now be used to test the dynamic hypothesis behind the long 
wave. To do so, the production sector  is  used to represent  the capital-producing 
sector of the  aggregate economy. The following equations are added or modified to 
implement the  test: 
OR, = GCOt + Cot (24') 
OCOt = exogenous 
where 
W R  =Goods sector ,  capital order  rate (units/year) 
GSL =Goods sector ,  supply line of unfilled orders  (units/year) 
The total demand fo r  oapital (eq. 24') is  now composed of two parts:  an exogenous 
o rde r  rate fo r  capital deriving from the  goods sector of the  economy (all noncapi- 
tal industries) and the self-ordering component: the  capital seotor's own o rde r s  
fo r  capital. The backlog of the  sector (eq. 23') becomes the sum of the  supply 
lines of the  goods and capital sectors. The supply line of the  goods sector (eq. 26) 
accumulates the  goods sector's orde r s  f o r  oapital less acquisitions, which are 
determined by the  delivery delay f o r  capital (eq. 27). A direct  consequence of 
self-ordering is  that  the  delivery delay f o r  capital faced by the capital sector is 
the time required to produce i ts  own output (eq. 25'). In addition, i t  is  assumed 
that  each order  in the  backlog has an equal probability of being filled. A s  a conse- 
quence, the  output of the  capital sector is  divided between the  goods and capital 
sectors in proportion to the i r  supply lines, implying the  priority of the t w o  sectors 
is  equal. 
Finally, note that  the  order  rate f o r  capital from the goods sector is  exo- 
genous. Thus only the  most  basic self-ordering mechanisms shown in Figures 1-3 
are included. The self-ordering feedback loops that  operate through growth 
expectations, labor markets, prices, financial markets, and aggregate demand 
(Figures 4-7) are not included. 
The model w a s  subjected to an unanticipated increase in orders  for  capital 
from the goods sector of one percent (a less than one-percent change in total capi- 
tal demand). The response (Figure 15) is a large-amplitude limit cycle with a 
steady-state period of forty-nine years. Figure 16 shows one complete cycle drawn 
f r o m  the steady-state region of Figure 15. The gross qualitative features of the 
behavior correspond to the long wave produced by the full National Model (Figure 
8) : 
1. The cycle has a period substantially longer than the business or Kuznets 
cycle and more than double the period of the production sector in isola- 
tion without self-ordering. 
2. Output rises slowly as capital is accumulated but falls precipitously, fol- 
lowed by a long depression while the excess capital depreciates. Capital 
peaks af ter  output. 
3. The delivery delay for capital peaks before the peak of output. 
4. The cycle is a limit cycle that persists without continuous exogenous 
triggering. 
To clarify the sources of the behavior, consider the sequence of events shown 
in Figure 16. In the 110th year, the capital sector has excess capacity and is pri- 
marily producing for the goods sector. N e t  investment in the capital sector is 
negative, and capacity is falling. As a result, utilization is rising. In approxi- 
mately the 118th year, capacity and orders become equal, but because backlog and 
delivery delay are below normal, output remains depressed. Capacity continues to 
fall until by year 120, capacity and output become equal, utilization reaches one 
hundred percent, and delivery delay becomes normal. However, the sector is not 
in equilibrium because capacity has fallen below orders, just as in the test of the 
sector without self -ordering. 
However, unlike the response of the sector in isolation, capacity and output 
do not then rise smoothly to equilibrium, but continue to expand well beyond the 
equilibrium level of output. Self-ordering is directly responsible, through several 
channels. 
Up until year 118, excess capacity meant the sector's gross investment w a s  
less than discards. As capacity falls towards orders, orders for capital rise to  the 
replacement level. Acquisitions, however, lag behind by the delivery delay. As a 
result, capacity falls below orders, and delivery delay rises above normal. Addi- 
tional orders are placed to correct this discrepancy, swelling the backlog of the 
sector, increasing desired output and causing still more  orders for oapital. This 
most  basic of the self-ordering loops is the inevitable consequence of the fact that 
capital is an input to its own production. As orders for capital are placed in an 
attempt to reduce the discrepancy between demand and capacity, self-ordering 
acts to increase the discrepancy by expanding desired production with each new 
order. The sector chases its own shadow. 
Second, because capacity is inadequate, delivery delay rises above normal. 
Thus a s  capital producers attempt to expand, they find capital acquisitions lagging 
further behind orders. As a result, capacity expands less rapidly than antici- 
pated, widening the gap between desired and actual capital, causing still more ord- 
ers to be placed, and further lengthening the delivery delay. 
Third, faced with lengthening lead times, capital producers attempt to com- 
pensate by ordering further ahead, allowing orders to expand still further. 
A s  a consequence, though output begins to grow rapidly, demand grows more 
rapidly, and the delivery delay rises. Within eight years capital acquisitions have 
expanded enough to allow capacity to gain ground on demand. By the 120th year, 
output is expanding as fast as orders, and delivery delay reaches its maximum 
Figure 15.  Long wave resulting f ram self-ordering 
YEARS 
Figure 16a.  Long wave: o r d e r s ,  product ion ,  and c a p a c i t y  
YEARS 
Figure 16b. b n g  wave: d e l i v e r y  d e l a y  and c a p a c i t y  u t i l i z a t i o n  
value. The sector's output now rapidly begins to catch up to orders, though ord- 
ers,  through self-ordering, continue to rise even though they a r e  now well above 
the equilibrium level. By the 132nd year, output overtakes orders and backlog 
reaches its peak. Delivery delay is now falling, reducing orders by accelerating 
acquisitions and reducing the required supply line. But though orders are now fal- 
ling, backlog and delivery delay remain well  above normal, forcing capacity to 
expand further. By the 134th year, delivery delay and backlog have return to nor- 
mal, but capacity is much higher than its equilibrium level. 
With output at record levels and orders plummeting, backlog and delivery 
delay reach and then drop below their normal values as firms attempt to maintain 
full utilization. The backlog is rapidly depleted, however, and utilization is forced 
down. Output drops precipitously, and the sector enters a period of depression 
with capacity f a r  in excess of demand. Note that capacity continues to rise even 
after  output has fallen. Though the sector's orders for capital peak in year 131 
and then fall precipitously, capital already ordered continues to arrive, worsening 
overcapacity.24 And since the lead time for capital.drops below normal, capital on 
order is delivered faster than expected, expanding capacity beyond anticipated 
levels. 
With its backlog depleted and capacity utilization a t  25%. the sector has, by 
year 139, cut gross investment to zero. Output and gross investment remain 
depressed for  the next two decades as capacity slowly depreciates, until capacity 
once again equals orders and the cycle begins again. 
COYMENTS ON THE BEAIJSH OF THE BEEIAVIOR 
The long cycle generated by the model with self-ordering closely resembles, 
in qualitative terms, the long wave generated by the National Model. But the mag- 
nitude of the fluctuation is extreme: delivery delay expands to  over 250% of nor- 
mal; capacity utilization falls to  a minimum of under 25%; total gross investment 
falls by over 75% from the peak with investment in the capital sector collapsing to 
zero. In comparison, between 1929 and 1933, US real private investment fell 88%, 
real GNP fell by 30%, and unemployment reached 25%. 
The extreme simplicity of the model is the cause of the extreme behavior. 
Since only the most  basic channels for  self-ordering are represented, the full bur- 
den of the disequilibrium pressures generated during the cycle must be borne by a 
few variables. One would expect that as additional structure and realism are 
added to the model, the burden borne by any individual channel would fall while the 
total amplification, to a first approximation, stayed the same. For example, the 
model excludes relative prices. In reality, as demand outstrips capacity, the price 
of capital would rise, easing some of the pressure on delivery delay by damping 
demand growth. A t  the same time, higher capital prices would encourage expan- 
sion and reinforce self-ordering through the mechanisms outlined in Figure 6. 
Given the extreme simplicity of the model, extensive comparison of the magnitudes 
of the variables to historical experience is not warranted. 
2 4 ~  recent  example is provided by t h e  commercial construction industry (Business Week, 
4 October 1982, pp.94-98). 
THE ROLE OF SELFrOBDERING 
The strength of self-ordering in equilibrium is governed primarily by the 
capital/output ratio. As calculated in equation (4), the  equilibrium multiplier 
effect created by self-ordering is given by I/ (I--COR/ ALC). Thus reducing the 
capital/output ratio should reduce both the  amplitude and period of the  cycle by 
reducing the  magnitude of the  capacity overshoot and hence the time required for  
oapacity to depreciate. Table 2 shows period, amplitude, and damping as a function 
of COR given the  other parameters of the  model. When COR a 0, self-ordering is 
eliminated, and the  behavior approaches that of the  sector in isolation with a 
period of twenty years  and a damping ratio of 93%. As COR rises, damping falls 
dramatically while t h e  period remains relatively constant. A t  COR a l . 6 ,  damping 
is eliminated and the oscillation reaches a fixed steady-state amplitude. Further 
increases in COR rapidly lengthen the period and boost the amplitude. The results 
verify the crucial role of self-ordering in lengthening the  natuml period of the  
accelerator mechanism portrayed in the  production sector. 
The other determinant of the  strength of self-ordering is the average life of 
capital ALC. Altering ALC has two  opposing effects. On the  one hand, ALC controls 
the  time required f o r  excess capacity to depreciate during the  depression phase, 
so shortening ALC should reduce the period. But shortening ALC also increases 
the  strength of self-ordering, suggesting a la rger  amplitude. Table 3 shows that 
the amplitude is  increased substantially as ALC falls. The period, however, is quite 
insensitive to ALC, and in fac t  tends to shrink as ALC gets  shor ter  o r  longer. 
Though a shor ter  ALC implies fas ter  decay of excess capacity, more rapid depre- 
ciation makes it  more difficult f o r  the  capital sector to catch up to orders during 
the expansion phase. Output overtakes demand at a later and higher level, so  even 
though excess capacity is eliminated more rapidly, more excess capacity is gen- 
erated, resulting in a reduction in period of only six years  when ALC is reduced 
from twenty to ten years. Similarly, a longer ALC extends the time required to 
eliminate excess capacity but reduces the  strength of self-ordering so tha t  output 
overtakes orders  at a much lower level. The results, particularly the  decrease in 
period with longer ALC, show the  period of the cycle to be determined primarily by 
the  strength of the  self-ordering loop and not the  life of capital. The insensitivity 
to ALC shows the cycle is not created by the  echo effect that  figures in some 
explanations of the long wave.25 
Self-ordering also operates through other  channels. During the  upswing of 
the cycle, rising delivery delays slow capital acquisition, fur ther  augmenting the  
backlog and lengthening lead times. To test the importance of this channel, i t  was 
assumed tha t  the  capital sector has absolute priority over the  goods sector when 
demand fo r  capital exceeds capacity, and is always able to receive capital within 
the  normal delivery delay: 
CA, = S L , / m  
GCA, = PR, - CA, (26') 
The result is  a 37-year cycle with an amplitude 70% as large as the base case. The 
qualitative features are largely unchanged. With priority over o ther  sectors, the  
2 5 ~ o t h  Kondrat iev  and De W o w  invoked  t h e  e c h o  effect t o  explain t h e  period o f  t h e  long 
w a v e  (Van Duiln 1983, pp.62; 67).  
Table 2. S e n s i t i v i t y  t o  Capital/Output Ratio 
Steady-State Ampl i rudeS 
COR (years )  Period (years )  .Damping ~ a t i o . '  ( 8  of  Base) 
0 
0 . 1  
0 .5  
1 . 0  
1 . 6  
2 .0  
2 .5  
3 .0  (base case )  
a 
'Damping Ratiog = 1 - Peak of  c y c l e  n/Peak o f  c y c l e  n-1 (measured w i t h  
respec t  t o  equilibrium va lues )  
Masured i n  Production Rate '  
Table 3. S e n s i t i v i t y  t o  Average Life  of Capital  
AIL (years )  Period (years)  Steady-state  Amplitudea (8  of Base) 
10 43 
15 45 
20 (Base Case) 49 
30 4 9  
40 35 
a 
measured i n  production r a t e  PR 
Table 4. Sens i t i v i t y  t o  Aggressiveness of Backlog Adjustment 
TAB {years)  Period (years)  Steady-State &nplitudea ( 8  of Base) 
0.5 55 
1.0 53 
1.5 (Base Case) 49 
2.7 39 
2.5 30 
a 
measured i n  production r a t e  PR 
capital sector can catch up to orders sooner and at a lower level. However, it is 
unlikely that  such allocation exists. All firms, to some extent, are involved in pur- 
chasing from each other.  Capital producers do not know the  extent to which their  
customers are coupled through self-ordering and certainly do not consult an  
input/output table to assign priorities on the  basis of the  technical coefficients of 
their  customers. The assumption of equal priorities is  probably roughly correct in 
the  aggregate, at last f o r  an  approximately competitive economy.26 
Self-ordering also operates through the  backlog correction (Figure 2). The 
aggressiveness. with which firms seek to maintain delivery delays at normal levels 
is controlled by the  time to adjust backlog TAB. A s  shown in Table 4, the  period 
and amplitude are inversely related to TAB. While the  amplitude is quite sensitive 
to TAB, the  period is relatively less sensitive. 
Likewise, more aggressive adjustment of capital to desired levels (Table 5) 
lengthens the  period and increases the  amplitude by boosting orders even fur ther  
above base-case levels f o r  a given discrepancy between desired and actual capital. 
Again the  variation in the  period is  less than the variation in the  amplitude. 
Speeding adjustment of the  supply line, in contrast, is  shbilizing (Table 6). 
Since the  capital and supply line corrections oppose each other,  more aggressive 
adjustment of the  supply line relative to the  capital stock effectively reduces the  
strength of self-ordering. Eliminating the  supply line correction altogether means 
capital once ordered i s  forgotten until i t  arrives, destabilizing the  system by caus- 
ing overordering, as can be verified in simulations without self-ordering. 
A s  described in Figure 3, the  rising delivery delay boosts the  desired supply 
line, adding still more to orders  during the  expansion phase. To test the  impor- 
tance of this channel, equation (14) was modified so that  the  desired supply line is  
always based on the  normal delivery delay, effectively eliminating the  hoarding 
phenomenon described by T. W. Mitchell: 
The result is a cycle with the same period and an amplitude (measured in output) 
90% as large. The timing and charac ter  of the  behavior are virtually unaffected. 
Therefore, the  decision rule for  the  desired supply line, though contributing some 
amplification, does not appear to play a strong role in the  long wave. 
THE BOLE OF NONLINEARITY 
The limit cycle behavior of the  model implies one or more nonlinearities bound 
what would otherwise be  an expanding oscillation. Two obvious nonlinearities are 
the  limitation on orders  as a fraction of capacity (eq.10). intended to capture 
bottlenecks and other  constraints on the  rate of expansion, and the  diminishing 
returns to capital (eq.16). Eliminating both nonlinearities by setting 
2 6 ~ h e  allocation ieeue r a i s e s  t h e  faecinating que&ion of whether a centrally planned 
economy could minimize o r  eliminate t h e  long wave through careful allocation of inveet-  
ment and output. Empirical evidence is inconclueive, and analyeis  is made diff icult  by en- 
trainment of market and central ly planned economies through trade. 
Table 5. Sens i t iv i ty  t o  Aggressiveness of  Capital Stock Adjustment 
TAC (years) Pcriod (years) Steady-State Ampl itudea (%  of Base) 
1 . 5  5 6 
2 54 
3 (Base Case) 49 
4 37 
5 31 
a 
measured in production rate  
Table 6.  Sens i t iv i ty  to Aggressiveness of Supply-Line Correc t io~  
TASL (years) Period (years) Steady-State Amplitudea (%  of Base: 
1.5 34 
2 4 2 
3 (Base Case) 49  
* 
4 51 
00 57 
a 
measured in production rate  
yields a period of 75 years and an amplitude nearly 3.5 times greater than the base 
case." The test clearly shows constraints on ei ther  the level or rate of capital 
expansion to be important factors in bounding the period and amplitude of the 
cycle. However, without these nonlinearities the cycle still reaches a finite 
steady-state amplitude, suggesting another nonlinearity is primarily responsible 
f o r  bounding the  oscillation. That nonlinearity is the capacity utilization formula- 
tion (eq. 2). 
In both Figures 14 and 16, output falls below capacity when the  backlog drops 
below a level consistent with the normal delivery delay, restraining the  overshoot 
of output and preventing the  backlog from.declining too f a r  below its equilibrium 
value. If output w e r e  always equal to capacity, however, backlog would decline 
further  below its equilibrium value, forcing larger  cutbacks in investment and des- 
tabilizing the cycle. Setting 
without self-ordering leaves the  period Largely unaffected but reduces the damping 
rat io from 93% to 35%. When self-ordering is added, equation (1") results in an 
expanding oscillation which soon drives backlog, delivery delay, and capital 
acquisitions below zero. A s  fur ther  confirmation of the importance of capacity 
utilization, the full model w a s  simulated with 
implying perfectly flexible capacity. The result is a highly damped response with a 
single overshoot of capacity above its equilibrium value. 
Thus the crucial nonlinearity is the relationship between backlog and capa- 
city. While aonstraints on the rate or level of capacity expansion may limit the 
period and amplitude of the cycle, fundamentally it is the fact  that output can only 
rise as aapacity grows that  creates the disequilibrium, and the fact  that  output 
must fall as the  backlog is depleted that l imits  it.'' 
27glirninating only one of t h e  nonlineari t ies  simply allows t h e  sys t em t o  g rawfu r the r  unti l  
t h e  remaining cons t ra in t  becomes binding. 
"~hough t h e  behavfor of t h e  model is d d n a t e d  by nonlinearity, ana lys is  of t h e  eigen- 
values of t h e  l inearised sys t em verif ied t h e  cruc ia l  ro le  of capacity ut i l isat ion in  con- 
trol l ing damping. Linearizing around t h e  in i t ia l  equilibrium with eq.(lnn) (CV=l)a yie lds  
dominant eigenvalues correrrponding t o  expanding oscillation wlth a period of 25.5 y e a r s  
and a growth r a t e  of t h e  envelope of i?IIX/year. In cont ras t ,  l inearizat ion with eq. (in") 
(CU=IP/E) yielded eigenvalues corresponding t o  a highly damped oscillation with a 
period of 23.8 y e a r s  and a decay r a t e  of t h e  envelope of lB%/year. Intui t ively,  t he  slope of 
CU determines t h e  r e l a t i ve  s t r eng ths  of t h e  osci l latory capital  acquisition loop and t h e  
s tab le  f i r s t -order  production scheduling loop. During t h e  expanrrion phase, ut i l ieat ion is 
a t  its maximum, and t h e  unstable loop dominates. As exces s  capaci ty  develops, CV fal ls ,  
and dominance s h i f t s  t o  t h e  s tab le  loop, limiting t h e  amplitude of t h e  cycle. 
The model presented here is not merely a set of equations which produce a 
long cycle. The decision rules portrayed in the model are consistent with the 
information-processing and decision making capabilities of economic agents. 
Further, the individual decision rules are locally or intendedly rational: they 
yield rapid. orderly, and appropriate adjustments to unanticipated shocks within 
the local environment of the organizational subunits responsible fo r  the decision. 
Y e t  as the complexity of the environment grows, the  overall rationality of the 
system's response is degraded. The results demonstrate what Simon (1947, p.81) 
calls 
"segments" of rationality.. . (the) behavior shows rational organization 
within each segment, but the segments themselves have no very strong 
interconnections. 
The positive feedback loops created by self-ordering increase the amplitude 
and lengthen the period of oscillations created by the production and investment 
policies of the sector. policies which, from the vantage point of the firm, a r e  quite 
rational. Indeed, an  individual firm cannot distinguish orders that are par t  of the 
"true" long-run demand from the  "false" orders generated by amplification and 
self-ordering. A firm or management team that  attempted to turn away orders or 
expand less aggressively on the grounds that it would cause overexpansion in 
twenty years would not Last long in the face of high delivery delays and rapid 
growth. 
The results show that  the dynamic hypothesis of self-ordering is sufficient to 
cause a long wave. given only the local rationality of the decision rules and the 
physical structure of capital accumulation. More precisely, the results show that  
self-ordering amplifies the disequilibrium pressures created by the interaction of 
locally rational decision rules and the Lags in capital acquisition within a firm, ver- 
ifying Forrester's statement (1977, p.534) that self-ordering "creates the 50-year 
cycle out of what would otherwise be a 20-year medium cycle in aapital acquisi- 
tion. " 
The model shows only the most fundamental feedback loops created by self- 
ordering, relationships which primarily involve the physical determination and 
allocation of output, are necessary to generate a robust long wave. But the suffi- 
ciency of the basic self-ordering channels does not mean other mechanisms are 
unimportant o r  irrelevant. Self-ordering also creates additional feedback chan- 
nels through, f o r  example. Labor markets, growth expectations, prices, financial 
markets, and aggregate demand. These are portrayed in the full National Model. 
One would expect that adding these additional mechanisms would add to the net 
amplification created by self-ordering. strengthening the long wave while adding 
"fine structure" to the behavior and permitting realistic policy analysis. 
The results should not be interpreted as excluding other mechanisms as arnpli- 
fying o r  contributory factors in the long wave. However, those who would argue 
fo r  the primacy of other mechanisms have yet to demonstrate the sufficiency of 
those mechanisms in a framework that permits reproducible testing. In particular. 
the model shows the long wave can arise with technology held completely constant 
(without even the technological changes implicit in varying the mix of capital and 
labor). The results suggest that  the historical long-wave pattern in innovations is 
the result of entrainment by the physical process of self-ordering ra the r  than 
vice-versa, as explained by Forrester (1977). and by Graham and Senge (1980). If 
the 'long-wave theory of innovation" more nearly describes the situation than the 
"innovation theory of the long wave" favored by the neo-Schurnpeterian school, 
policies directed at stimulating innovation may be insufficient to mitigate the 
effects of the current  long-wave downturn.29 These issues have important policy 
implications, and i t  is  hoped that  the  methodological framework illustrated with the  
single model presented here  can provide the common ground f o r  systematic 
exploration of the  forces behind the long wave, contributing toward an integrated 
theory of disequilibrium economic behavior. 
" ~ 0 t h  Freeman ct a1. (1982) and Van Duifn (1983) argue for stimulus of innovation as  
prime components of an effective strategy to  counter the long wave. While renewed com- 
mitment to  R&D i s  needed, these results suggest dealing with excess physical capacity 
may be more important (Mass and Senge 1981; Sterman 1983). 
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